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 In this chapter, we review some current controversies in statistics and measurement and 
suggest what they might mean for research in sport psychology. The first section of the 
chapter deals with the debate on the use of null hypothesis testing, a debate that has gathered 
considerable momentum over the past five years. Because most research in our field still 
relies on conventional tests of significance – after all, that is the approach still advocated in 
most textbooks - it is important that we review the arguments for and against significance 
testing and consider whether we need to change the way we do things. Our own summation 
of the debate is that it comes down to a question of reliability: the faith one has in one’s 
experimental outcomes. We suggest a number of ways in which researchers in sport 
psychology can improve the confidence they have in the results of single studies. 
 
Rethinking the Null Hypotheses Significance Testing (NHST) 
 Recently one of our papers has returned from a review process.  The response of one of 
the reviewers is used here to signify the concern that several leading statisticians in the 
behavioral and social sciences have with what is termed “Null Hypothesis Significance 
Testing” (NHST).  The reviewer wrote: 
 “With three dependent variables, a repeated measures MANOVA would be the 
appropriate analysis for this data.  At least with an experimentwise Bonferroni 
adjustment of ANOVA p values, significance criterion would be actually around .016, 
putting most results in doubt, and definitely attenuating the discussion presented of 
already non-significant results.  MANOVA would also provide a report on sphericity 
compliance in multivariate data - supporting or rejecting the use of RM degrees of 
freedom (360 in the denominator) in what are already, at least, only marginal F values”. 
 It should be noted, before we discuss further the NHST, that the effect sizes obtained in 
the study ranged between 0.40 and 1.71, and although the procedures suggested by the 
reviewer would reduce experimentwise error rate, they would also reduce the power of the 
study.  There is nothing technically wrong with the advice of the reviewer, but we wish to 
make the point that this sort of advice is driven by a concern for strict adherence to the NHST 
approach. We have to ask: Is “significance level” really an additional amendment that should 
be added to the 10 amendments already published in the old testament?  We shall now 
address this concept in more depth. 
 According to Cohen (1994) who quotes Morrison and Henkel (1970) and earlier 
researchers, the NHST “has not only failed to support the advancement of psychology as a 
science but also has seriously impeded it” (p.997).  It is mainly the 0.05 significance level on 
which Ho is rejected that concerns Cohen.  The common neglect of “base-rates” before 
testing any hypothesis, advocated by Bayesian theorem, results in a substantial error as a 
consequence of adopting a low and arbitrary probability such as 0.05. Loftus (1996) further 
argues that “... reliance on NHST has channelled our field into a series of methodological cul-
de-sacs, and it has been my observation over the years ... that conclusions made entirely or 
even primarily based on NHST are at best severely limited, and at worst highly misleading” 
(p.162). 
 To make sense out of NHST one should specify what is meant by a “difference” between 
two or more means of the population.  The probability that the means will be identical is zero 
and therefore “meaningful” differences should be proposed.  Thus, instead of asking whether 
there are differences between two or more means, the question should be “how big are the 
differences?  Are they big enough for the investigator to care about and, if so,  what pattern 
do they form?” (Loftus, 1996, p.163).  When simply testing for mean differences, “rejecting a 
typical null hypothesis is like rejecting the proposition that the moon is made of green 
cheese... Well, yes, okay, but so what” (Loftus, 1995, p.163).  The null hypothesis according 
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to Schmidt (1992) is always false and therefore the rate of Type I error is zero resulting only 
in Type II error.  Thus, our science is going nowhere due to false results which rely on 
significance levels rather than magnitudes of effects. “Amounts” are more important than 
“directions” when verifying a theory.  It is for this reason that regression coefficients are 
more stable than correlation coefficients and therefore recommended.   
Loftus (1996) argues that  “... investigators, journals, journal editors, reviewers, and 
scientific consumers often forget ... and behave as if the .05 cutoff were somehow real rather 
than arbitrary.  Accordingly, the world of perceived psychological reality tends to become 
divided into “real effects” (p<=.05) and “non-effects” (p>.05) ... no wonder there is an 
epidemic of “conflicting” results in psychological research” (p.164).  It is for this reason that 
meta-analytical studies end up with zero effect-size.  When appropriate measures are applied 
and magnitudes estimated, base-rates could be determined and used for testing hypotheses.  
The 0.05 level of significance would no longer be the ultimate criterion for accepting or 
rejecting theories. 
 What then should we do in order to advance the domain of sport and exercise 
psychology?  We advocate that instead of imitating other domains, we should develop 
statistical procedures which better account for the behaviors observed in our field.  We 
summarise the recommendations made by Cohen (1994) and Loftus (1996) in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Recommendation to Improve the Statistical Procedures in the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
 Cohen (1994)  Loftus (1996) 
(1) Use graphical presentation (1) Plot data rather than present in Tables plus F and p 
values 
(2) Use effect-sizes to show magnitudes and 
confidence-intervals (CI) to replace p values 
in NHST.  The smaller the CIs the greater the 
power. 
(2) Provide Confidence Intervals (CI) to assess the 
statistical power of the results.  It visually shows 
how the pattern of means reflects the population 
means-pattern (see Loftus & Masson, 1994 for 
review) 
(3) Decide upon a “good enough” range to test 
hypotheses.  Determine differences in units 
such as effect-size; logits; etc. (see Serlin & 
Lapsley, 1993 for review) 
(3) Compute effect-sizes for single studies and overall 
ES plus variation and CI for a set of studies.  
Control for independent variables such as gender, 
culture, instrumentation, ego, type of 
task/treatment, duration of interventions, etc. 
(4) Challenge the results with alternative 
explanations (perceptual control over 
independent variables) 
(4) Set a quantitative hypothesis about the underlying 
pattern of means (i.e., assign weights) and 
correlate with observed means (i.e., “planned 
comparison”) 
(5) Add likelihood ratios and Bayesian methods 
(Goodman, 1993; Greenwald, 1975) 
(5) When interaction emerges, instead of focusing on 
differences between the dependent variable at a 
fixed level of the independent variables (vertical 
differences), look at differences between the 
independent variable (horizontal differences) at a 
fixed level of the dependent variable 
(6) Rely on replication   
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 These are all good suggestions and are echoed by others in the literature. Hammond 
(1996), for example, advocates the use of confidence intervals and effect sizes. He also 
recommends the use of replication to improve reliability. Gonzalez (1994) lists four 
principles to guide psychological research: 
• the theoretical model should play a central role in guiding the analysis; 
• the theoretical model should suggest parameters to estimate; 
• the researcher should create a design that permits proper estimation of the parameters;  
• intervals should be placed around parameter estimates.  
Gonzalez goes on to advocate the use of a Bayesian approach wherein one has to estimate 
one’s prior belief in an hypothesis and then compute a posterior belief on the basis of data 
gathered in the study. The essence of the Bayesian approach is the moderation of one’s 
beliefs in the light of empirical data. Gregson (1997) argues that the problem is more serious 
than simply replacing a “significance” test by a confidence interval and also agrees with 
Gonzalez that a Bayesian approach is the preferred option.  
Grayson, Pattison, and Robins (1997) made an interesting contribution to the debate 
when they summarised the alternatives as follows: 
• continue as at present with objective tests of null hypotheses that severely limit what 
we can say about the results of a study; 
• move towards a Bayesian approach that is intuitively appealing but where the 
requirement for prior knowledge poses some difficulties; 
• adopt some intermediate position, such as a “commensense approximation to 
Bayesian confidence intervals in the absence of prior knowledge..”. 
Grayson and his colleagues stopped short of recommending any particular approach, 
preferring instead to urge researchers to be more flexible in their thinking about the role of 
statistical inference in research: 
We also believe that the context of a problem may well affect the interpretive position 
that one might wish to adopt. In one situation, meta-analysis of existing, focused, 
pertinent research may be very useful; in another scientifically new, exploratory 
context, the null hypothesis could well be a very important speculation at which to 
address evidence; in another well-studied situation, a more quantitative Bayesian 
approach to inference about parameter values may be especially valuable. (p.70) 
The important point made by Grayson et al. (1997) is that there is unlikely to ever be any 
resolution of the debate over preferred statistical approaches and that scientists should not 
adopt a passive role, waiting to see which side emerges the victor. Rather, scientists should 
recognise that they are in the best position to judge how data should be interpreted. 
 
Implications for Sport Psychology 
 It would be pointless if we were to advise researchers in our field to abandon the NHST 
when it is still so widely accepted (and expected) by journal editors and reviewers. Nor 
would we wish to do so. The NHST is so well-entrenched that it is likely to take many years 
before it ceases to be the dominant paradigm. Certainly it will retain this status whilst the 
textbooks continue to favour the NHST position. Instead, we would urge researchers to take 
the not-quite-so-adventurous steps of reporting effect sizes and confidence intervals rather 
than relying soley on a test of the null hypothesis. This will give researchers wider scope for 
the interpretation of research findings. We would also argue that the real crux of the NHST 
debate hinges on the question of reliability: it is a debate not so much about alpha levels and 
confidence intervals as it is about the confidence we are prepared to place in our own 
experimental findings. Basically, with the NHST approach, one can make two kinds of 
errors: a Type I error where one has rejected the null hypothesis when it was inappropriate to 
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do so; or a Type II error where one failed to reject the null hypothesis when it should have 
been rejected. These errors will only be detected with replications that fail to support the 
original decisions; hence Hammond’s (1996) emphasis on replication. To improve the 
reliability of research outcomes, we agree with Hammond (1996) that replication is 
important, but we would disagree that it is the only way of improving reliability. Another 
way of improving reliability is by improving the measures one uses in a study and also by 
increasing the number of measures. We will illustrate both of these principles in research 
conducted in our own laboratories. 
 
Improving Reliability by Collecting Multiple Measures 
 Kirker (1997) investigated how aggression and violence develop in basketball and ice-
hockey.  He assumed that aggression is most likely a result of a combination of factors, and 
therefore the more causal factors that are present, the greater the likelihood that an aggressive 
act will occur.  Also the severity of the aggressive acts are believed to be a function of the 
number and intensity of actors present.  The sequence or combination of causal variables is 
not easily specified, and factors may operate simultaneously.  Thus multivariate causal traces 
should be considered. 
 Kirker believed that self-report and introspective measures alone have limited value in 
understanding sport aggression in real competitive settings.  Such tools are best applied in 
conjunction with more ecologically valid and objective measures (i.e., naturalistic 
observation).  The observation of behavior in a natural setting provides opportunities for 
researchers to better understand the complex dynamics of aggressive behavior in sport.  
Aggression is best studied in real time and in the context it occurs.  Practical constraints, such 
as the need for extensive training of observers, expense, and lengthy data analysis have 
traditionally been the main barriers to observational research.  Today, through the use of the 
computer and video technology, these logistic difficulties can be overcome, and 
observational analysis can be used in a more sophisticated manner. 
 In Kirker’s study, questionnaires were constructed to assess the attitudes of players and 
officials towards aggression, to determine relevant aspects of histories of aggression, and 
generally to gain some insight into the factors found to be related to aggression in sport but 
not directly observable and thus not able to be analysed through observational coding.
 With observational analysis, intentionality is essentially inferred.  In this study, such 
inferences were made under rigorous conditions by experts through repeated replays of sport-
specific behavioral typologies, incorporating hypothesised typical intention and severity of 
actions.  This approach advances on the use of single measures such as officials’ ratings of 
penalised behaviors made without the aid of video replays and without supplementary data 
from the athletes themselves (Russell & Russell, 1984; Widmeyer & Birch, 1994). In the 
determination of causality, the use of observational analysis, questionnaire data, and players’ 
and officials’ comments on a video replay of behaviors of interest, advances on previous 
methodologies. 
 Experts have been used previously to assess the nature of aggressive-like behaviors (Bar-
Eli & Tenenbaum, 1989; Teipel, Gerisch, & Busse, 1983; Widmeyer & Birch, 1984).  In 
these previous studies, the experts used were not directly involved in the behaviors under 
investigation.  They were using their personal experience to infer intention behind acts 
committed in general (Widmeyer & Birch, 1984) or by others (Bar-Eli & Tenenbaum, 1989; 
Teipel et al., 1983).  Here, experts involved in the observed behaviors of interest were used.  
Furthermore, the role of the experts was expanded so that they became involved in the 
categorisation of behaviors (taxonomies for coding), questionnaire development, observation 
of behaviors, and inferences of causation. 
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 To carry out the study the following measures were taken: 
•  The histories of games between the teams involved were reviewed and recorded. 
•  Four experts, two in each sport, were recruited to develop two taxonomies of violations 
and aggressive acts based on the literature and their experiences and the official game 
regulations.  Taxonomies consisted of several dimensions and classifications of severity. 
•  Attitudes Toward Aggression Questionnaires and single items were provided to players 
and officials at training sessions prior to filming games. 
•  Four games, two ice-hockey and two basketball, were filmed.  A CAMERA (Computer 
Acquisition of Multiple Ethnological Records and Analysis) video coding equipment was 
used for observational analysis.  The CAMERA system contains PC-compatible computer 
software which records the sequence of distinct behavioral events occurring in real time, 
each with start and stop times.  Complex interactions were broken down to manageable 
segments and sessions.  For each game, two cameras were used: one directed to the play, 
the other to the court/rinkside behavior of coaches and substitutes.  Also, microphones 
were placed on officials and on the sidelines to pick-up comments from the bench and 
crowd. 
•  Classification, considerations of causation, and rating-like behaviors were recorded by 
the experts individually on the computer while watching the games on video.  The 
taxonomies were used as references. 
•  The players exhibiting the aggressive behaviors were invited to observe their acts on 
video and reflect on the reasons behind these acts. 
•  The most severe aggressive acts were selected and referenced as “Zero” point.  Up to 
four minutes of footage before and after each act from each game was analysed.  Details 
of players exhibiting these behaviors and recipients of the behaviors were recorded on the 
computer output, along with game score, time phase, and any other relevant information. 
 The single analysis for each aggressive act enabled Kirker to integrate the information 
collected and generalise the findings across the two games in each of the two sports. When 
such procedures are adopted, more meaningful conclusions can be made as to how aggressive 
acts are developed and subsequently how we can modify or minimise their occurrence. The 
use of multiple measures was instrumental in achieving the aims of this particular study.  
 Another way of improving the reliability of research projects involves the use of  
measures that are ecologically valid. One of the most frustrating experiences that social and 
behavioural scientists undergo is the low amount of dependent variable variance accounted 
for by the independent variables. This can be improved by the use of more ecological 
paradigms in which performance is measured according to some objective criteria in addition 
to the self-ratings that seem to form the bases of so many studies in sport psychology. We 
argue that when the dependent variable is measured under conditions which completely 
mimic the real world, more variance of this dependent variable will be accounted for by other 
psychological variables. Again, this is easier to demonstrate by referring to another research 
project in our laboratory. 
 In exercise physiology, measures such as oxygen uptake and anaerobic threshold account 
for the majority of the variance of long-distance running times.  The non-accounting variance 
is sometimes attributed to psychological variables. Recent psychological theories (see 
Tenenbaum, 1996 for review) have postulated that goal-orientation interacts with 
environmental conditions to influence effort and adherence in exertive-type tasks.  Perceived 
ability, self-efficacy, self-control, and determination are also believed to be important 
mediators of behavioral outcomes. Two studies have examined this theory using real-life 
exertive conditions to measure consistency and adherence under such conditions.  Calcagnini 
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(1996) asked non-active participants and anaerobic and aerobic athletes to squeeze the 
handbar of a dynamometer at 50% of their maximal squeezing strength as much as they could 
until a decrease of 10% of their designated value.  Freeman (1997) asked his participants to 
run on a treadmill as much as they could for 90% of their maximal oxygen uptake.  Measures 
of the psychological variables were taken prior to and after the completion of the tasks.  The 
dependent variable was how much time participants could sustain in the zone of exertive 
tolerance?  In each study, the “time in the zone of exertive tolerance” was the dependent 
variable while physical activity, goal-orientation, coping strategies, and determination were 
the predicting clusters in a hierarchical regression procedure.  The results are presented in 
Table 2(a,b.). 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Predicting “Time in Zone of Exertive Tolerance” in Aerobic (a) (Running) and 
Strength (b) (Squeezing a Dynamometer) Tasks 
 Variable Step mult R R2 ∆R2 
(a)      
 Activity Type 1 0.33 0.11 - 
 (aerobic, anaerobic, untrained)     
 Goal orientation 2 0.55 0.31 0.20 
 (task, ego)     
 Coping strategies 3 0.61 0.38 0.07 
 (self control, self efficacy, perceived 
ability) 
    
 Determination 4 0.69 0.48 0.11 
      
(b)      
 Activity Type 1 0.33 0.11 - 
 (aerobic, anaerobic, untrained)     
 Goal orientation 2 0.56 0.31 0.21 
 (task, ego)     
 Coping strategies 3 0.65 0.43 0.12 
 (self control, self efficacy, perceived 
ability) 
    
 Determination 4 0.76 0.59 0.16 
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 As expected, the results in both studies revealed that psychological variables play an 
important role in determining how one can tolerate exertive conditions.  Though the 
participants’ activity type determined 11% of the exertion tolerance variance, goal orientation 
added 20% and 21% additional explained variance, while coping strategies added an 
additional 7% and 12%, and determination 11% and 16%, respectively.  A total of 48% and 
59% of variance was accounted for.  These values are far above those that are common in 
social and behavioral research.  We use these studies to illustrate our point that this line of 
research should be encouraged and applied. 
Improving Measurement Operations 
 There is yet another way of improving the reliability of individual studies that we can 
address here. It concerns the measurement process itself, a theme to which we have alluded 
elsewhere (Tenenbaum & Fogarty, 1997). Cohen (1994) stated that: 
 To work constructively with “raw” regression coefficients and confidence intervals, 
psychologists have to start respecting the units they work with, or develop measurement 
units they can respect enough so that researchers in a given field or subfield can agree to 
use them. In this way, there can be hope that researchers’ knowledge can be 
cumulative...A beginning in this direction comes from meta-analysis.....But imagine how 
much more fruitful the typical meta-analysis would be if the research covered used the 
same measures for the constructs they studied.  (p. 1001). 
 Meta-analyses would undoubtedly be more useful if the studies all used the same 
measures, but they would be doubly useful if the measures themselves satisfied basic 
measurement properties. As early as 1928, Thurstone stated that scales are not sufficient if 
they do not satisfy the requirement of having an “origin” or a defined “zero-point” with units 
of measurement that extend from the origin in a linear fashion. To achieve this, Thurstone 
(1928) stipulated that there should be a systematic attempt to select items that in fact do elicit 
a linear response from “low” to “high”. The requirement for a zero origin poses some 
difficulties for the classical measurement model. A score of zero tells us little because it does 
not indicate that the individual has zero ability, it simply indicates that the individual did not 
get any of the items in the test correct or, in the case of an attitude scale, did not select any 
option with a value above zero. Nor can we easily make interpretations about the intervals 
between different total scores. Classical measurement processes do not satisfy the 
requirement for a zero origin and equal units of measurement in the way stipulated by 
Thurstone. 
 The essential prerequisites for constructing such a measure comprise (a) a consistent 
definition of the domain of investigation (Thurstone, 1928), (b) selection of items which best 
represent the domain and share a common content classified under a single heading 
(Guttman, 1944), and (c) administration of the resulting scale to a sample of the relevant 
population in order to examine the response patterns. Andrich (1981) argued that the 
requirements outlined by Thurstone (1928)  and Guttman (1944) which define the concept of 
psychological scaling, are solved by the Rasch model. In Andrich’s (1981) words, 
“The most important distinguishing feature of Rasch’s models is that, when they hold 
within some specified frame of reference, they provide explicit comparisons of person 
parameters which are independent of other persons to be compared and also independent 
of the parameters of the questions or items used to obtain the required responses.  In 
achievement testing these parameters are the abilities of persons and the difficulty of 
items, while in attitude measurement they may be termed respectively attitudes and, 
following Thurstone, affective values.  The explicit separation distinguishes these models 
from other psychometric models, generally called latent trait models, within which 
framework the Rasch models are often placed”.  (p.2) 
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 The Rasch method yields person measures and item values that are independent of 
each other.  Both represent points on linear continuums and both rely on measurement units 
called logits that have a true zero point with equal units of measurement extending in either 
direction. 
 There are many benefits to using Rasch measurement, some of which were described in 
Tenenbaum and Fogarty (1997). In this section, we will show how Rasch analysis can be 
used to check whether a scale is suited to the population being studied.  In this study, the 
Task and Ego Orientation in Sport Questionnaire (TEOSQ: Duda & Nicholls, 1992) was 
administered to 91 athletes participating in an aerobic task. The TEOSQ measures task and 
ego orientation in competitive activities and has  quite a lot of supporting psychometric data 
gathered using the classical test model approach. That is, there is evidence that the TEOSQ 
does measure two independent factors and that scales developed on the basis of these two 
factors are reliable and relate in a meaningful way to external constructs. What else could we 
learn by using a Rasch approach? 
 One requirement for good measurement is that a test instrument should be appropriate 
for the population. Among other things, it should be neither too easy nor too difficult. This 
requirement also applies to attitude scales such as the TEOSQ where it is possible to translate 
“difficulty” into terms of how easy respondents find it to agree with the items. Where a likert 
scale is used, as is the case with the TEOSQ, easy items are ones which respondents feel 
inclined to rate highly. If the items in a test are too easy, they will not discriminate among the 
respondents. If they are too difficult, the same applies. The problem of matching a test with 
respondents is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Items           **  ****  ** *   * 
              Ability Continuum 
Persons                          **** ***  **** ***  *   * 
 
Figure 1 
Illustration of Mis-Match Between Tests and Persons 
 
In this illustration, the test is too easy for the respondents: the items are all tapping the low 
end of the ability continuum whilst the respondents are located at the upper end. In a research 
situation, such a test would not be able to discriminate among the respondents. Administering 
the test would be a complete waste of time. One of the most basic applications of Rasch 
analysis enables researchers to draw maps showing where both items and respondents are 
located on the underlying ability continuum (or attitudinal continuum in the case of an 
attitude scale). Analyses of this type can be very useful. The item-respondent map for the 
TEOSQ ego scale is shown in Figure 2. 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Item Estimates (Thresholds)                                 
all on ego (N = 91 L = 6 Probability Level=0.50)                                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  4.0                            | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 |       6.4 
                                 | 
  3.0                            | 
                                 |       4.4 
                          XXXX   |       1.4 
                                 |      11.4 
                                 | 
                           XXX   |       3.4    9.4 
                                 | 
  2.0                            | 
                           XXX   | 
                                 | 
                            XX   | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                        XXXXXX   |       6.3 
  1.0                            | 
                          XXXX   | 
                                 | 
                        XXXXXX   |       4.3 
                       XXXXXXX   |       1.3 
                                 |      11.3 
  0.0              XXXXXXXXXXX   | 
                           XXX   |       3.3    6.2    9.3 
                                 | 
                        XXXXXX   | 
                        XXXXXX   |       4.2 
                                 |       1.2 
                          XXXX   |      11.2 
 -1.0                      XXX   | 
                                 |       3.2    9.2 
                          XXXX   | 
                                 | 
                         XXXXX   | 
                                 |       6.1 
                             X   | 
 -2.0                            | 
                         XXXXX   |       4.1 
                                 |       1.1 
                                 |      11.1 
                           XXX   | 
                                 |       3.1    9.1 
                                 | 
 -3.0                            | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                            XX   | 
 -4.0                            | 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Each X represents    1 students 
 
Figure 2 
Rasch analysis of TEOSQ (Ego): Person and Item Locations in Logit Units                                
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The map may be a little hard to read if you haven’t seen one before, so we will explain it 
carefully. The line down the middle represents the attitudinal continuum. People with a high 
ego orientation are represented by crosses towards the top left hand side of the diagram. Item 
locations  are shown on the right hand side of the diagram. Because the TEOSQ uses a five-
point Likert scale, the Rasch analysis shows four locations for each item. The locations 
represent the thresholds between the five categories. Thus, 3.1 on the bottom right of Figure 2 
represents the amount of the latent trait (ego orientation) required before one marks the 
second Likert option rather than the first for item 3. Moving up the right hand side of the 
diagram, it can be seen that an attitudinal value of approximately –1.0 represents the 
threshold between category 2 and category 3 of this same item. People with lower amounts of 
ego orientation will select option 2 or option 1, people with higher amounts will select option 
3 or higher. To select the highest option for item 3, one would need a value above 2.0 on the 
ego-orientation continuum. We can see from the crosses on the left hand side that only seven 
people marked option 5. Overall, the ability span of the items and the persons who are 
responding match very well. There are items that will discriminate among most respondents. 
This is a favourable outcome. 
 The map for the task scale of the TEOSQ paints a somewhat different picture. It is shown 
in Figure 3. 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Item Estimates (Thresholds)                                 
all on task (N = 91 L = 6 Probability Level=0.50)                                 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  3.0                            | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                          XXXX   | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
  2.0                            | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                     XXXXXXXXX   | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                     XXXXXXXXX   | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
  1.0                            |      10.4 
               XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX   |      12.4 
                                 | 
                                 |       8.4 
                                 |       5.4 
                  XXXXXXXXXXXX   |       7.4 
                                 |       2.4 
                                 | 
                      XXXXXXXX   |      13.4 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                XXXXXXXXXXXXXX   |      12.3 
                                 | 
                           XXX   | 
  0.0                            | 
                          XXXX   |       2.3 
                                 | 
                           XXX   |       5.3 
                                 | 
                           XXX   |       8.3 
                                 | 
                             X   |       7.3 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 |      10.2   13.3 
                                 | 
                                 |       8.2 
 -1.0                            | 
                                 |       7.2 
                                 | 
                                 |       5.2 
                                 | 
                                 |      13.2 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 | 
                                 |       5.1 
                                 | 
 -2.0                            | 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Each X represents    1 students 
Figure 3 
Rasch Analysis of TEOSQ (Task): Person and Item Locations in Logits 
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Here, there is a slight mismatch between the items and the respondents. The mismatch can be 
summed up by saying that the respondents found the items too easy (i.e., they rated them 
“high”). There are no items that can discriminate reliably among the top 20 or so respondents 
in this study. 
 The sorts of problems described above can be detected quite easily using a Rasch 
analysis, and they can be corrected quite easily by choosing other tests or by adding items to 
cover the blank spots in the continuum. The importance of this kind of analysis, however, 
cannot be overestimated. Analysis of between-group differences, pretest-posttest 
comparisons, and correlational analyses will all prove rather futile if the test or attitude scale 
one uses is incapable of discriminating among the population being studied. Problems of this 
nature are as fundamental as whether one uses the NHST or some other approach. This brings 
us back to a point raised by Grayson et al. (1997) when they stressed the predominant role 
that the researcher - rather than the statistician - should play in the research process. In the 
field of sport psychology, we probably need to extend the whole debate one step further, to 
include the role of the consumers of research, the practitioners who are too-often left to 
convert esoteric research findings into practice that will lead to performance improvements. 
We would like to conclude this chapter by expanding the theme somewhat to include both 
researchers and practitioners.  
 
The Scientist-Practitioner Approach 
 Though the role of the practitioner in the development of the behavioral and social 
sciences was debated for a long period of time, and much progress has been made since then, 
the scientific-practitioner dilemma is still misunderstood.  Barlow, Hayes, and Nelson (1984) 
suggested methodologies which enable practitioners to empirically collect data on the 
interventions they use with their clients so that behavioral changes could be better accounted 
for and evidence of their effectiveness be more sound.  Accordingly the scientific side of 
practice consists of three interrelated activities: (a) practitioners consume research findings 
on techniques they can apply when necessary, (b) practitioners use their own intervention 
using empirical methods to increase accountability, and (c) practitioners become researchers 
by producing new data from their own observations and measures to advance the scientific 
domain. 
 It is evident though that the prevailing experimental techniques which are based on large 
groups of participants, means and significance levels, comparisons and predictions in 
determining treatment effectiveness widen the scientific-practitioner gap (Barlow et al., 
1984).  About 21 years ago Cohen (1976) in a review of educational and health professionals 
reported that fewer than 20% of research articles have some applicability to field 
practitioners.  Moreover, about 40% of mental health professionals believe that no research 
exists that is relevant to practice.  Though Cohen (1981) raised the difficulty in defining 
research utilizition, this concern remains today and we strongly believe that it is evident in 
the sport and exercise psychology domain.  It is a common finding that observations made by 
clinicians were disregarded by scientists and research findings were perceived as 
inappropriate or trivial by practitioners (Strupp, 1968).  Thus is seems that both scientists and 
practitioners seem to be insensitive to each other’s work (Lehrer, 1981).   
 To overcome the disputes between practitioners and scientists, Barlow et al., (1984) 
suggest to practitioners an integrated model of applied research that has the potential to 
narrow the gap and contribute substantially to any domain which involves human and social 
interactions.  We believe that if these principles were appropriately applied to the sport and 
exercise psychology domain, better models which are field-driven would be established, and 
more accountability for interventions would be evident.  Therefore, we shall briefly introduce 
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the principles of this integrated model. 
 The first stage involves an assessment of current interventions suggested in the literature.  
Such a review can lead practitioners to develop or enhance one or more of these 
interventions.  In the next stage, a short-term study on the effectiveness of these techniques is 
necessary.  Some initial comparisons are needed to establish alternative or modified 
interventions for specific problems.  Then, long-term outcome studies should take place in 
order to test for intervention efficacy.  This procedure is necessary in order to compare the 
findings reported by researchers and the findings in typical clinical settings (Agras & 
Berkowitz, 1980).  At this stage, long-term outcomes and systematic field testing are 
substantially missing.  Therefore, the extent of effectiveness and generalizability of the 
reported findings concerning intervention and treatment are very limited. 
 To solve some of the methodological problems associated with practice, practitioners are 
encouraged to treat large numbers of athletes or exercisers in diverse settings.  Care should be 
given particularly to successes and failures as the series progresses and subsequently, to the 
reasons  for these outcomes.  In particular those alterations and/or additions that have been 
made to secure intervention success are to be accounted for.  Failures, through the process of 
clinical replication, and their reason, should also be reported.  At this stage the use of 
different measures is essential along with appropriate application of single case experimental 
design (see Chapters 8 - 10 in Barlow et al., 1984).  A schematic representation of the various 
stages of this approach is displayed in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Schematic Display of the Integrated Model of the Scientist-Practitioner Approach Introduced by Barlow, Hayes, 
and Nelson (1984) 
 
 Time-series methodology is recommended to practitioners since variability attributed to 
other sources than that of treatment can be identified at the individual level and therefore 
more reliable rules can be generated that relate particular client or therapist characteristics to 
outcome.  Thus, single-subject designs should be used with many individuals so that 
generalizability can be identified.  Such a methodology, in contrast to group-comparison 
methodology, may offer more possibilities for applications but “it is only through the work of 
many practitioners that the development of rules of generalizability, based on the analysis of 
the individual, become practical” (Barlow et al., 1984, p.66).  Thus large-scale, multicluster, 
clinical collaborative studies are believed to become an alternative to the classical positivistic 
approach. 
 An essential component in the empirical practitioner approach is accountability.  
Accountability can be achieved only when good measures are sufficiently valid and sensitive 
to the treatment provided to the clients.  Each athlete, coach, or exerciser should be provided 
with realistic “measures of change”.  Only through sufficient measures can the practitioners 
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evaluate their efforts.  Though hundreds of measures were developed in recent years (see 
Ostrow, 1996), one should be cautious before choosing an appropriate measure or any 
observational  procedure to evaluate or measure changes associated with (a) any problem, 
trait, and/or state, and (b) estimate “changes” in certain behavior/s.  Many surveys in the past 
indicated that a substantial amount of measurement tools are impractical in the applied 
setting (Ford & Kendall, 1979; Wade, Baker, & Hartman, 1979).  Thus, in the sport and 
exercise domain, we suggest that both practitioners and scientists first read the items before 
submitting questionnaires to their clients.  Then, if necessary, submit the questionnaire to 
clients and question for clarity and appropriateness.  Treatments can be improved 
substantially by awareness of measurement problems, measuring different aspects that 
treatment is aimed at, and enhancing accountability (Barlow et al., 1984). 
 Next we briefly specify the guidelines and principles suggested by Barlow et al., (1984) 
for collecting measures in practical settings.  These guidelines, through their scientific 
perspective, may advance any social/behavioral field and establish better ecological theories.  
These guidelines are as follows: 
• State client’s problems or concerns in specific terms.  Specific terms are measureable or 
observed.  Ask clients about their specific goals and wishes.  Use Problem-Oriented 
Record (POR) and obtain subjective data (S), objective data (O), assessment (A), and 
plan (P), (SOAP).  Goal-attainment scaling (i.e., for each goal establish a scale) is a 
recommended procedure. 
• Specify several problem behaviors.  Behaviors and interventions are complex and should 
be broken-down into dimensions and segments.  Quantified measures should be obtained 
for each problem, regardless of their importance.  In several cases, measures that are 
unrelated to the treatment can also be applied. 
• Obtain multiple measures for each problem behavior.  One measure is sometimes 
insufficient for diagnosis.  Sometimes measures of the same trait/state are in accordance 
with each other.  Thus, through clinical replications, the “best” measure for the 
“particular situation” can be determined.  Inconsistency among measures can be then 
attributed to “method variance”.  Frequency in reported asynchrony among motoric, 
physiological, and self-report measures is due to confound measurement methods and the 
content being measured (Cone, 1979). 
• Select measures that are both sensitive and meaningful.  Choose molecular measures that 
are very sensitive to intervention changes though lacking in construct validity (i.e., 
smiles, violent acts, eye contact, etc.) along with molar measures which have high 
construct validity but lack sensitivity (i.e., many of the introspective questionnaires in 
use).  Molecular measures should be tested very frequently whereas molar measures 
should be tested on a monthly or longer basis. 
• Collect measures early in the course of treatment.  This secures a substantial baseline for 
late treatment accountability.  At baseline, it is recommended that many measures are 
used to detect problems and concerns. 
• Some measures should be taken repeatedly prior, during, and following treatment to 
account for reasons and outcomes.  Such measures are used as feedback for the 
psychologist as to the effectiveness of the treatment/technique and to indicate when 
alteration is necessary. 
• Comparisons should be made within a specific measure only if data are collected under 
similar conditions, to enable valid comparisons to be made across measurement.  
Irrelevant factors (time of talk, etc.) that occur during the intervention are kept constant to 
enable later cause-effect conclusions.  It is of vital importance to insure that changes in 
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behaviors are due to real events rather than uncontrolled  conditions, as behavior is 
situation-specific.  Measures should be sensitive to situational changes. 
• Quantitative data should be presented graphically. On the time axis, different measures 
should be displayed in parallel along with remarks of changes and alterations that have 
taken place in specific points of time.  Graphs provide a convenient means of data storage 
that can be used later for subsequent analysis and conclusions. 
• Convenient measures should be measured more frequently than inconvenient measures.  
Some measures that may supply additional information do not have to be collected 
frequently, though they may supply evidence for different aspects associated with the 
interventions. 
• Selection of good and accurate measures is essential.  Multiple-methods and measures are 
recommended.  Though psychometrically sound measures are recommended, use of 
“real” measures of what clients do in their natural environment is necessary.  These 
behaviors should be recorded by trained observers to secure accuracy.  The quality of the 
self-monitoring data can be improved if clients are aware that their reliability can be 
detected.  Thus, “reliability check-ups” are also important.  The selection of instruments 
which have “functional utility” is therefore required. 
Once these procedures are adopted, the domain of sport and exercise psychology may be 
recognised as a “target domain” in which the practitioner-scientist gap has been narrowed 
and ecological theories have been developed. 
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